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THE CASE FOR OUTSIDE REVERSE VEIL
PIERCING IN NEW MEXICO
Laura Spitz*

INTRODUCTION
A corporation is a distinct legal person.1 This is a foundational tenet of the
modern American legal system. As such, except in extraordinary circumstances, a
corporation’s shareholders will not be held liable for corporate actions or debts
absent some commitment to guarantee them. Instead, a shareholder’s liability is
limited to her financial contribution to the corporation. In other words, if a
corporation is unsuccessful, a shareholder may lose her investment—the price she
paid for her shares or the amount she lent to the corporation—but no more. This is
true in reverse as well; a corporation is not ordinarily responsible for the actions and
debts of its shareholders. This makes sense as shareholders and corporations are
separate legal persons, and persons are not ordinarily liable for one another’s debts.
In the vocabulary of corporate law, shareholders have limited liability.2
At the same time, courts—including New Mexico courts3—have made clear
they will not permit shareholders to use the corporate form for an improper purpose
and cause harm to others. This is one of the limits of limited liability. As a matter of
both public policy and equity, courts will disregard a limited liability entity to “pierce
the corporate veil” and hold a shareholder personally liable for a corporation’s
actions or debts where, for example, “the corporation was set up for fraudulent
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1. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 667 (1819); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). New Mexico recognized the corporate form even before the adoption
of its constitution. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, ¶ 16, 70 N.M. 65, 69,
370 P.2d 502, 505. More recently, see Scott v. AZL Res., Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 118, 753
P.2d 897 (“[A] corporation will ordinarily be treated as a legal entity separate from its shareholders.”).
2. New Mexico’s steadfast protection of the corporate form provides the foundation for the state’s
public policy in favor of limited liability. Through separate legal personhood, limited liability ensures that
investors will not incur person liability for the debts of the corporation. Without the fear of personal
liability, the state hopes to incentivize investors to invest large sums of capital into corporations in New
Mexico. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 6, 753 P.2d at 900.
3. Corporate limited liability “is the rule and not the exception.” Wirth v. Sun Healthcare Grp., Inc.,
2017-NMCA-007, ¶ 35, 389 P.3d 295, 304; Cruttenden v. Mantura, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 97 N.M. 432,
640 P.2d 932; Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 15, 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40; Scott, 1988NMSC-028 ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900; Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 7, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216;
Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 20, 23.
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purposes, or where to recognize the corporation [as a separate entity4] would result
in inequity.”5
In a classic veil piercing case, the court pierces a corporation’s veil to reach
the assets of its shareholders to satisfy an obligation of the corporation. This is known
as “vertical” piercing because the plaintiff and the court are literally looking up a
corporation’s organizational chart to its shareholders for a corporate debt. However,
as corporate organization and corporate law have grown in complexity, American
courts have had to adapt the veil piercing doctrine. Businesses increasingly use more
complex corporate structures and therefore create new challenges for claimants
seeking to pierce the corporate veil. For example, in addition to the more traditional
“vertical” piercing, courts have been asked to consider “horizontal”6 and
“triangular”7 veil piercing, as well as a distinct but related remedy, “enterprise
liability.”8 In practice, horizontal, triangular, and enterprise liability claims are less
4. In some ways, this is a remarkable remedy precisely because the court is saying two legal persons
will be considered one for the purpose of providing a remedy to a plaintiff. In such circumstances, the
formal legal personhood of the corporation is disregarded. Put another way, it is a legal subject in name
only, stripped of certain rights ordinarily associated with personhood. For examples where human persons
have been stripped of many of the rights associated with legal personhood and treated like property, see
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 18 (2011); JAMES FORMAN, JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2017).
5. Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 1976-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 17, 18, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623 (Courts
may look behind the corporate form “where the corporation was set up for fraudulent purposes, or where
to recognize the corporation would result in inequity.”); see also Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 19, 671
P.2d at 44 (holding that it is improper to pierce the corporate veil unless directors, officers, and
shareholders used or contributed to corporate funds for the purpose of perpetuating fraud or “promoting
their personal affairs”).
6. Classic veil piercing is applied vertically: courts are looking to a corporation’s shareholders to
satisfy the debts of the corporation. Horizontal piercing refers to piercing the corporate veil between
affiliated entities controlled by the same, or substantially the same, owners. Dill v. Rembrandt Grp., Inc.,
2020 COA 69, ¶¶ 23, 40, 474 P.3d 176, 183, 186 (Colo. App. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20SC460, 2020
WL 6325871 (Colo. Oct. 26, 2020) (“Colorado corporate law permits horizontal veil piercing, under the
traditional veil piercing test, between entities that share common ownership through another entity, but
only if the veil of each corporate entity is also pierced. . . . [H]orizontal veil piercing may occur between
entities that do not share direct common owners, but that indirectly share common owners through another
entity in an ownership chain.”). See also Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966), appeal
after remand, 287 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aff’d, 244 N.E.2d 55 (N.Y. 1968); Lea v.
Kentwood & E. Ry. Co., 60 So. 370, 373 (La. 1912). Note that a crucial distinction between horizontal
piercing and horizontal consolidation is the former requires a finding that the non-defendant or non-debtor
entities are alter egos of the defendant/debtor, while the latter does not. See DAVID A. WARFIELD, ABIGAIL
B. WILLIE, KAY STANDRIDGE KRESS & G. BLAINE SCHWABE, III, BUSINESS TRACK: IT WASN’T ME!:
DEALING WITH SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, ALTER EGO, VEIL PIERCING AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO INSOLVENT COMPANIES, 102617 ABI-CLE 67 (2017).
7. Triangular piercing occurs when “a controlled corporation is held liable for the debts of an
affiliated corporation, through an intermediary controlling shareholder. The liability flows in a triangle,
first from the controlled corporation to the controlling shareholder, then from the controlling shareholder
to the affiliated corporation.” Matthew D. Caudill, Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York Not-ForProfit Corporation, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 469 (2003).
8. Enterprise liability treats a group of related entities as a single entity for some or all purposes.
“The result is to construct a new aggregate of assets and liabilities. . . . The decisions disregard the paper
corporate personalities and base the results on the assets of the enterprise.” Adolph Berle, Jr., The Theory
of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348 (1947) (cited in John H. Matheson, The Limits of
Business Limited Liability: Entity Veil Piercing and Successor Liability Doctrines, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
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common than traditional veil piercing claims. A more widespread development,
however, is “reverse” veil piercing. In a reverse piercing case, the court pierces a
corporation’s veil from the “other direction” to reach the assets of a corporation and
treats those assets as belonging to a shareholder of the corporation. There are two
distinct types of reverse veil piercing: “inside” and “outside.” Courts engage in inside
reverse piercing for the benefit of a so-called insider, usually a shareholder, seeking
to claim the corporation’s assets as its own, often at the request of the shareholder
and with the support of the corporation.9 In contrast, courts apply outside reverse
piercing for the benefit of an outsider, typically a creditor seeking to satisfy the debt
of a shareholder, at the request of the creditor and over the objections of the
corporation.10
Although both inside and outside reverse veil piercing are reverse piercing
in a directional sense, they are sufficiently distinct to raise different questions of
corporate law and public policy.11 The distinctions between inside and outside
reverse veil piercing are sometimes overlooked by advocates and courts, and the
failure to be specific has led to some confusion in the jurisprudence.12 To understand
the distinctions, one must understand how each doctrine functions. An inside reverse
piercing claim is typically brought by the party or parties using and benefiting from
the limited liability entity itself. In a common example, a shareholder attempts to
have the corporate entity disregarded to avail itself of certain corporate assets, such
as accounts receivable or claims against third parties. In other words, the insider
seeks to claim the assets of the corporation as its own.13 In another example, a
shareholder might want to bring corporate assets under the shelter of some legal
protection from third-party claims, where the shelter is available only for assets
owned by the shareholder and not for assets owned by the corporation.
REV. 411, 422 (2004)). In practice, enterprise liability often requires triangular—and therefore vertical
and horizontal—veil piercing. “The alter ego doctrine [described infra, Part I.A.] may be used to hold
shareholders liable for the debts of their corporation (traditional veil piercing), to hold a corporation liable
for the debts of a sole shareholder (reverse veil piercing), or to hold parent, subsidiary or affiliate
corporations liable for the debts of another corporation.” Dry Handy Invs., Ltd. v. Corvina Shipping Co.
S.A., 988 F. Supp. 2d 579, 682 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Medici888, Inc. v. Rileys Ltd., No. 2:12cv317,
2013 WL 5533235, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144231, at *9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added).
9. In re Petters Co., Inc., 561 B.R. 738, 750 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016); Spradlin v. Beads & Steeds
Inns, LLC (In re Howland), 516 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014); see also Gregory S. Crespi, The
Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 37 (1991). For an argument
that inside reverse veil piercing may, in certain circumstances, advance “significant public policies,” see
Stephen Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014) (citing Stephen Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil
Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235, 246–
48 (2013)) (arguing that reverse veil piercing provides the analytical framework to disregard the corporate
entity to allow shareholders to exercise religion through a corporate entity).
10. Crespi, supra note 9, at 37.
11. With respect to inside veil piercing, for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed
that “many courts strongly oppose allowing a company’s veil to be pierced for the benefit of the
individuals who themselves have created the company.” Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d
375, 385 (4th Cir. 2018).
12. For example, some courts have purported to reject “reverse piercing,” but a close reading of the
cases reveals they mean to reject “inside reverse piercing.”
13. Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 VFW of the United States, Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d
639, 644–45 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (citing Crespi, supra note 9, at 37).
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Inside reverse piercing claims often arise in the context of corporate
bankruptcy.14 Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,15 shareholder claims enjoy low
priority against the bankruptcy estate, and inside reverse piercing offers the potential
for shareholder access to corporate assets that would otherwise be used to satisfy the
debts of senior creditors. Inside reverse veil piercing has also been used to allow
parent and subsidiary entities to be viewed as a singular employer for purposes of
receiving the benefit of workers’ compensation immunity.16
Outside reverse piercing, on the other hand, more clearly maps onto
traditional veil piercing analyses. A shareholder’s creditor—or in the vocabulary of
the doctrine, a corporate outsider—will seek to pierce the corporate veil to reach the
assets of the shareholder’s corporation to satisfy a debt of the shareholder17 on an
alter ego or instrumentality theory.18 The creditor might be a “voluntary” creditor,
such as a bank, or an “involuntary” creditor, such as a tort victim. Typically, the third
party seeks to pierce the veil only after it has brought a successful claim against the
corporate shareholder.19 In such cases, the successful claimant would ordinarily use
standard judgment collection procedures to attach the judgment to the debtor’s
shares in the corporation. In an outside reverse pierce case, the successful claimant
would seek instead to attach the corporation’s assets directly.20
The New Mexico Supreme Court has not explicitly considered reverse veil
piercing,21 although it has applied the doctrine without naming it.22 Nevertheless, the
number of states to consider and adopt the doctrine in either or both forms has grown
rapidly in recent decades. It is likely only a matter of time before New Mexico courts
14. Gugino v. Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC (In re Clark), 525 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2014); Butler v. Candlewood Rd. Partners, LLC (In re Raymond), 529 B.R. 455 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015);
Dzikowski v. Friedlander (In re Friedlander Cap. Mgmt. Corp.), 411 B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); In
re Howland, 516 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014); In re Petters Co., 561 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2016).
15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (West).
16. Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).
17. Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 50 F. Supp. 3d 267, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Although
uncommon, New York law recognizes ‘reverse veil-piercing,’ where, as here, a party seeks to hold a
subsidiary liable for the actions of its parent or shareholders.”).
18. In re Howland, 516 B.R. at 166; In re Knight, 574 B.R. 800, 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017). See
also In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645 (“Outside reverse piercing claims occur when a corporate outsider
‘pressing an action against a corporate insider seeks to disregard the corporate entity [and] to subject
corporate assets to the claim’ or when an outsider ‘with a claim against a corporate insider seeks to assert
that claim against the corporation in an action between the claimant and the corporation.’” (quoting Crespi,
supra note 9, at 55)).
19. Kathryn Hespe, Preserving Entity Shielding: How Corporations Should Respond to Reverse
Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 69, 76 (2013).
20. Wick v. Ach, 2019-Ohio-2405, 139 N.E.3d 480, 483, at ¶ 5.
21. In re Hess, 618 B.R. 13, 21 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2020) (noting that New Mexico appellate courts have
not addressed insider or outsider reverse piercing).
22. See Addison v. Tessier, 1959-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 14–15, 65 N.M. 222, 335 P.2d 554. In that case,
defendant shareholder had transferred assets to a corporation in which he had a 98% interest for the
purpose of avoiding having to pay creditors. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that “the legal entity
of the corporation must be disregarded for purposes of satisfying appellant’s judgment [against the
shareholder].” Without using the vocabulary of outside reverse veil piercing, the court permitted the
creditor to disregard the corporation entity—pierce the corporate veil—to reach the assets of the
corporation to satisfy the debts of its controlling shareholder.
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will be asked to explicitly consider its applicability in the state. In anticipation of
such development, this article surveys New Mexico veil piercing jurisprudence and
other states’ reverse piercing jurisprudence and concludes that outside reverse veil
piercing is consistent with New Mexico law and public policy. As with traditional
veil piercing, outside reverse piercing is driven by a concern that the corporate form
has been misused by one or more shareholders, causing some injustice or inequity.
Outside reverse piercing should therefore be adopted in the state.23 I leave the
question of whether New Mexico courts should adopt inside reverse veil piercing for
another day.24
This article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the current law on veil
piercing in New Mexico. Jurisdictions that adopt outside reverse piercing often apply
much the same test for both traditional and outside reverse veil piercing cases;25
accordingly, the best predictor of how New Mexico courts will approach outside
reverse piercing is how they have approached traditional veil piercing. Part II
summarizes the positions of other jurisdictions to have considered outside reverse
veil piercing, as well as themes, concerns, and key debates in outside reverse piercing
cases. This jurisprudence points in the direction of adopting the doctrine in New
Mexico and demonstrates its consistency with New Mexico law and public policy.
Finally, Part III suggests a possible—and arguably likely—test to apply in outside
reverse piercing cases in New Mexico.
I.

CLASSIC VEIL PIERCING IN NEW MEXICO

The common law doctrine of veil piercing in New Mexico is well
established, and there are several New Mexico Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
decisions in agreement about the required elements.26 In New Mexico, a plaintiff
must show that: (A) the corporate form is a mere instrument or alter ego of another
person;27 (B) the corporate form has been used for an improper purpose;28 and (C)
23. To the extent that New Mexico corporate law is not so different from other states, much of the
analysis in this Article should be generally applicable in those states as well.
24. To the extent that outside reverse veil piercing implicates vertical, horizontal, triangular, or
enterprise liability issues, I would endorse the approach of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Dill v.
Rembrandt Grp., Inc., 2020 COA 69, ¶¶ 22–23, 474 P.3d 176, 182–83 (Colo. App. 2020), cert. denied,
No. 20SC460, 2020 WL 6325871 (Colo. Oct. 26, 2020).
25. Texas, Colorado, New York, and Virginia are examples.
26. The elements applied by New Mexico courts are not unlike those applied in other states, such as
Colorado, Texas, New York, and North Carolina (among others). See, e.g., Connolly v. Englewood Post
No. 322 VFW of the United States, Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006); SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454–55 (Tex. 2008); Bagel Bros. Maple, Inc. v. Ohio
Farmers, Inc., 279 B.R. 55, 62 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Fischer Inv. Cap., Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689
S.E.2d 143, 147 (N.C. App. 2009). These states have adopted outside reverse veil piercing as well.
27. Scott v. AZL Res., Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (“[T]he subsidiary
or other subservient corporation was operated not in a legitimate fashion to serve the valid goals and
purposes of that corporation but . . . instead under the domination and control and for the purposes of
some dominant party.”); Cruttenden v. Mantura, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (“To
find that a subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent corporation, it must be established that the parent control
is so complete as to render the subsidiary an instrumentality of the parent.”).
28. A finding of domination or instrumentality will not suffice; “improper purpose must [also] be
established.” Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 15, 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40. See also
Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 20.
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misuse of the corporate form caused harm to the plaintiff.29 Veil piercing is an
equitable remedy;30 consequently, the rules governing the granting of equitable
remedies also operate here. Finally, the burden of proof is on the party “seeking to
impose individual liability on the shareholder to demonstrate that the grounds for
piercing the corporate veil exist.”31 In the subsections that follow, I elaborate on each
of the elements required by the doctrine.
A.

Instrumentality

To pierce the corporate veil, claimants must show that the corporate form
is a mere instrument of another person.32 New Mexico courts often refer to the first
element—instrumentality—as the alter ego theory.33 It has been described as
29. Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶¶ 10–13, 671 P.2d at 43.
30. Id. ¶ 9; Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900. It is less clear whether veil piercing might
also provide a separate cause of action. The answer has implications for both pleading and due process. If
a shareholder was not named in the underlying complaint, the question becomes whether a judgment
creditor may file a second action against the shareholders on an alter ego theory when they did not
participate in the underlying litigation, at least not in their personal capacities. While there is no New
Mexico Supreme Court case on point, this question was certified to the Nevada Supreme Court, which
answered in the affirmative.
The first question asks whether a judgment creditor may bring a claim for alter ego
to make a third party liable on the judgment or whether alter ego is only a remedy.
The Nevada federal district court predicted that the alter ego doctrine can be a
separate cause of action when the claim is filed as a means for a judgment creditor
to pursue the execution of a prior judgment. We agree. . . . [A] judgment creditor
may bring a claim for alter ego to make a third party liable on a judgment.
Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc., 450 P.3d 911, *2–3 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished table decision). As a
matter of due process, this makes sense. The third party must have the opportunity to defend itself; as such
it must have notice and an opportunity to be heard in the original hearing or be named in a subsequent
cause of action. See Petty v. Bank of N.M. Holding Co., 1990-NMSC-021, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 524, 787 P.2d
443; Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 11, 13, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216 (“Under our rules of
‘notice pleading,’ it is sufficient that defendants be given only a fair idea of the nature of the claim asserted
against them sufficient to apprise them of the general basis of the claim[.]”) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
31. Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23 (quoting Nursing Home Grp. Rehab Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Suncrest Health Care, Inc., 162 Ohio App. 3d 577, 581, 2005-Ohio-3945, 834 N.E.2d 382, ¶
12). Veil piercing implicates one final due process issue related to courts’ jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. Where, for example, a plaintiff’s case is being heard in state A, the corporate defendant is
also a resident of state A, but its shareholder is a resident of state B, most courts have not hesitated to find
personal jurisdiction. “Put simply, separation of formal corporate identities does not impose a
constitutional barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation.” Alto Eldorado P’ship
v. Amrep, 2005-NMCA-131, ¶ 25, 138 N.M. 607, 124 P.3d 585 (quoting Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v.
Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 508 (D. Kan. 1978)). Instead, the requirement for personal jurisdiction
in New Mexico is the satisfaction of due process, not the application of substantive corporate law. See
Morrisey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 2, 25, 365 P.3d at 21, 26.
32. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900 (“[T]he subsidiary or other subservient corporation
was operated not in a legitimate fashion to serve the valid goals and purposes of that corporation but . . .
instead under the domination and control and for the purposes of some dominant party.”); Cruttenden,
1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 640 P.2d at 934. (“To find that a subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent corporation,
it must be established that the parent control is so complete as to render the subsidiary an instrumentality
of the parent.”).
33. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900 (citing Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 11, 671 P.2d
at 43). See also Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Amrep, 2005-NMCA-131, ¶ 19, 138 N.M. 607, 124 P.3d 585
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“dominat[ion] . . . to the extent that the corporation does not have a will of its own.”34
Put another way, the shareholder’s control renders the corporation an instrumentality
or “mere business conduit” of the shareholder.35 (The corporate shareholder can be
an individual or another corporation.)
To satisfy this element, the plaintiff must show that a corporation is the alter
ego of its shareholder. In the vocabulary of legal personhood, the plaintiff must show
that the shareholder has not in fact treated the corporation as a separate legal entity
or person. In deciding whether a corporation is the alter ego or instrumentality of a
shareholder, New Mexico courts consider the following factors:
(1)
Does the shareholder own all or a majority of the capital
stock of the corporation?
(2)
In the case of a parent and subsidiary, do the parent and
subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers?
(3)

Does the shareholder finance the corporation?

(4)
Did the shareholder subscribe to all the capital stock of
the subsidiary or otherwise cause its incorporation?
(5)

Is the corporation undercapitalized?

(6)
In the case of a parent and subsidiary, does the parent
corporation pay the salaries or expenses or losses of the
subsidiary?
(7)
In the case of a parent and subsidiary, does the subsidiary
have substantially no business except with the parent corporation
or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation?
(8)
In the case of a parent and subsidiary, do the papers of the
parent corporation and the statements of its officers refer to “the
subsidiary” as such, or as a department or division of the parent?
(9)
Do the directors or executives of the corporation act
independently in the interest of the corporation or do they take
direction from the shareholder?

(finding that alter ego theory may be applied to “pierce the corporate veil . . . to disregard the . . .
corporation and its subsidiary for purposes of liability”) (citation omitted).
34. Estate of Bishop v. Mulholland, No. 30,016, 2011 WL 5397134, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2011) (unpublished).
35. Cruttenden, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 640 P.2d at 934 (citing Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury,
524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975)); Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900.
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(10)
Are the formal legal requirements of the corporation as a
separate and independent corporation observed? 36
Courts are clear that these factors are guidelines for consideration; the
answer need not be yes to all questions in all cases.37 Nor is the list exhaustive. In
Garcia v. Coffman, for example, Dr. Coffman argued that the plaintiff had not
established his control or domination over the corporation at issue because the
plaintiff “did not introduce evidence that: [the corporation]’s shareholders ignored
corporate processes or formalities; the corporation was under-capitalized; and
shareholder and corporate funds were commingled.”38 Acknowledging that these can
be important factors, the Court of Appeals nonetheless found that, “the foregoing
considerations [do not] cover the territory with respect to alter ego.”39 Rather, the
court’s inquiry focused on whether the domination exercised by Dr. Coffman was
“substantially more than the control which would be exercised by any majority
shareholder.”40 In that case, the court was satisfied that Dr. Coffman’s corporation
was his alter ego, relying on the following evidence:
Coffman was the sole shareholder. He established policies
designed to limit the judgment of [the corporation’s] employees
and to mislead [its] patients as to the need for treatment. [The
corporation]’s board of directors was comprised of Coffman, his
wife, his brother, and a select group of employees. Coffman’s wife
was appointed chief executive officer and boss of [the corporation]
without an election. Coffman and his wife determined all salaries.
Coffman’s 1991 salary of $600,000 was more than one-third of the
total salaries paid to all employees. Coffman’s wife’s 1991 salary
of $2,308 was increased to $660,008 in 1992. Coffman borrowed
from and loaned money to [the corporation].41
While the court referenced several of the factors listed above, the court’s focus was
on the question of control as a substantive—rather than formal—matter. Courts
remain guided by the larger inquiry: Is the corporation an instrument or alter ego of
another person or entity? The answer to this question will be heavily fact dependent.

36. Cruttenden, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 640 P.2d at 934–35 (citing Int’l Union v. Cardwell Mfg. Co.,
416 F. Supp. 1267, 1286 (D. Kan. 1976)). These are substantially the same factors famously outlined by
Frederick Powell in his study, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 (1931).
37. Cruttenden, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 640 P.2d at 935 (citing Int’l Union, 416 F. Supp at 1286). For
example, because New Mexico does not require that the corporation be incorporated for an improper
purpose to satisfy the second element of the test, the first question takes on more significance than the
fourth.
38. Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 17, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the
Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 16 (1978)).
41. Id. ¶ 16.
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Improper Purpose

Next, New Mexico courts require some evidence that the corporation is
being used in an illegitimate manner or for an improper purpose.42 Courts look for
“[s]ome form of moral culpability attributable to the [shareholder].”43 This makes
sense, given that the policy animating the remedy is a desire to prevent the
manipulation of the corporate form to further a shareholder’s interests.44 A Denver
Law Journal article45 frequently cited with approval by New Mexico courts46 reminds
us that, “[t]he heart of most corporate veil cases, explicitly or implicitly, is that a
corporation has been used for such an improper purpose that equity will permit its
corporate form to be disregarded.”47
A careful reading of the cases suggests that there are really two dimensions
to a finding of improper purpose. First, courts look for evidence that the shareholder
is not using its status as a shareholder “for the purpose of participating in the affairs
of the corporation in the customary and usual manner, but for the purpose of
controlling the [corporation] so that it may be used as a mere agency or
instrumentality of the [shareholder].”48 Control in and of itself is not necessarily
determinative of an improper purpose—if it were, there would be no distinction
between the first two elements. Rather, the distinction between the two elements rests
on the shareholder’s moral culpability. Courts look behind the act of domination or
instrumentality to either a shareholder’s motive for doing business a particular way
or to the resulting injustice to third parties if the separate entity is recognized.49 The
improper purpose element is driven by a concern that if the court recognized a
corporation’s separate existence in these circumstances, it would amount to court

42. Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 20 (explaining that, for policy
reasons, this improper purpose must be established before the shareholder can be held liable for the actions
of the corporation); Scott v. AZL Res., Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897.
43. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 753 P.2d at 901 (“Some form of moral culpability attributable to the
parent, such as use of the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud is required.”) (citation omitted); Garcia, 1997NMCA-092, ¶ 22, 946 P.2d at 221 (citing Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 753 P.2d at 901); Morrissey, 2016NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23 (citing Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 753 P.2d at 901).
44. Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 1976-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 17, 18, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623 (noting
that courts may look behind the corporate form “where the corporation was set up for fraudulent purposes,
or where to recognize the corporation would result in inequity”) (citation omitted); see also Harlow v.
Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 19, 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (stating that it would be improper to
pierce the corporate veil where directors, officers, and shareholders did not use or contribute to corporate
funds for purpose of perpetuating fraud or “promoting their personal affairs”) (quoting Hill v. Dearmin,
609 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo. App. 1980)).
45. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 41.
46. See e.g., Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23; Garcia, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 24, 946
P.2d at 221; Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 12, 671 P.2d at 43.
47. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 41, at 28 (cited in Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 12, 671 P.2d at 43)
(emphasis added).
48. W. G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107, 1110–11 (Wash. 1956) (citing Platt v. Bradner Co.,
230 P. 633, 635 (Wash. 1924)) (emphasis added).
49. Scott v. AZL Res., Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 6, 9, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897; Harlow, 1983NMCA-117, ¶ 12, 671 P.2d at 43.
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sanction of the resulting injustice.50 In the words of the Texas Court of Appeals,
which also requires findings of instrumentality and improper purpose:
The second element examines whether the corporate form was
employed for illegitimate purposes such that holding only the
corporation or the individual liable would result in an injustice. . . .
The “injustice” that gives rise to an application of alter ego liability
emanates from “the kinds of abuse . . . that the corporate structure
should not shield—fraud, evasion of existing obligations,
circumvention of statutes, monopolization, criminal conduct, and
the like.”51
In looking for evidence of an improper purpose, New Mexico courts
consider several factors,52 including whether the corporation is undercapitalized,53
fraudulently manipulated,54 or mismanaged55 in some way, especially if such
manipulation or mismanagement results in corporate losses. Courts are also
concerned with failures to observe corporate formalities.56 On the other hand, even
where formalities are observed, courts will accept evidence that the observation of
corporate formalities is a sham.57 The initial act of incorporation itself may be
evidence that the corporate form is being used for an improper purpose where, for
example, a corporation is set up to put assets out of the reach of a shareholder’s
creditors.58 New Mexico law is clear, however, that misuse of the corporate form
after incorporation may also satisfy this element of the test.59 Finally, while fraud is
50. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Krendl & Krendl, supra note 41, at 18); Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d
at 900 (citation omitted). See also Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23.
51. Richard Nugent & CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 266–67 (Tex. App. 2018)
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Garcia, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 20–22, 946 P.2d at
220–21.
52. Jemez Agency, Inc. v. CIGNA Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (D.N.M. 1994) (citing Scott, 1988NMSC-028, ¶ 6, 753 P.2d at 900).
53. Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 21, 365 P.3d at 25 (citing Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. W.
Physician Search, L.L.C., 175 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“Inadequate capitalization is
circumstantial evidence of an improper purpose or reckless disregard for the rights of others.”)).
54. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 753 P.2d at 901.
55. An improper purpose occurs when the corporation’s assets are misrepresented to the detriment
of creditors. Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 1976-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 16–19, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623.
56. See Jemez Agency, 866 F. Supp. at 1345 (citing Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358,
1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (“Circumstances justify disregard of the corporate entity if separation of the two
entities has not been maintained and injustice would occur to third parties if the separate entity were
recognized.”)).
57. Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 21, 365 P.3d at 25 (first citing Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 10, 753
P.2d at 901 (“[A] party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must show that the financial setup of the
corporation is a sham and causes an injustice. . . . Mere proof that the corporation is now insolvent is
insufficient.”); and then quoting Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840 N.E.2d 767, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(“It is inequitable to allow shareholders to set up a flimsy organization just to escape personal liability.”)).
58. Addison v. Tessier, 1959-NMSC-010, ¶ 13, 65 N.M. 222, 335 P.2d 554 (“[W]hen circumstances
surrounding the incorporation indicate an intention to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, such corporate
entity must be set aside.”) (citation omitted).
59. Estate of Bishop v. Mulholland, No. 30,016, 2011 WL 5397134, at *4 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2011) (unpublished) (citing New Mexico case law for the proposition that “mismanagement at any
subsequent time may be used to establish evidence of an improper purpose”).
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obvious evidence of an improper purpose, it is not necessary to prove fraud to
establish an improper purpose.60
New Mexico courts have found improper purpose in a variety of
circumstances. For example, where a shareholder has used a corporation for the
purpose of “promoting [the shareholder’s] personal affairs,”61 where a subsidiary
was used by its parent corporation to perpetrate a fraud,62 where an entity was
incorporated with “an intention to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,”63 where a
corporation’s assets and purposes were misrepresented to third parties,64 and where
a corporation and shareholder jointly participated in or directed improper activities.65
C.

Causation

The two leading New Mexico cases on the causation element are Garcia v.
Coffman66 and Morrissey v. Krystopowicz.67 In Garcia v. Coffman, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant chiropractor, Dr. Coffman, individually and through his
corporation, “designed and implemented a treatment program for personal injury
patients, such as [the] Plaintiff, for the purpose of generating income for [the
Defendant] to the detriment of the patients.”68 For example, “an excessive number
of x-rays were taken, the x-rays were marked up by an unqualified staff member, and
the x-ray results were not used in treatment.”69 At trial, the jury determined that Dr.
Coffman dominated and controlled his corporation for his own purposes and that
such conduct caused damage to the plaintiff.70 In affirming the jury’s determination
to pierce the corporate veil to reach Dr. Coffman, the Court of Appeals found
causation and held that “it is sufficient to show some knowing or cooperative effort
between the related parties which results in unjust injury to the plaintiff, even though
it may not be possible to prove that the defendant’s control directly caused [the]
plaintiff’s injury.”71
More recently, in Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, the Court of Appeals
confirmed that “a direct causal link to the tort-related acts is not required.”72 In that
case, the defendant, Krystopowicz, was the sole shareholder of the corporation in
question and had created ten limited-liability companies that each owned a nursing

60. Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 8–12, 753 P.2d at 900–01; Jemez Agency, 866 F. Supp. at 1345.
61. Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 19, 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (quoting Hill v.
Dearmin, 609 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo. App. 1980)).
62. Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 21, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216 (citing Krendl & Krendl,
supra note 41, at 42).
63. Addison, 1959-NMSC-010, ¶ 13, 335 P.2d at 557 (citation omitted).
64. Garcia, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 21, 946 P.2d at 221.
65. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
66. 1997-NMCA-092, 946 P.2d 216.
67. 2016-NMCA-011, 365 P.3d 20.
68. Garcia, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶ 4, 946 P.2d 218.
69. Id. ¶ 5.
70. Id. ¶ 7.
71. Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Krendl & Krendl, supra note 41, at 27); cited with approval in Morrissey, 2016NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23.
72. Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 17, 365 P.3d at 24.
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home in New Mexico.73 The plaintiff lived in one of these facilities the year before
her death.74 Her personal representative sued both Krystopowicz and the corporate
defendants for, inter alia, wrongful death. The corporate defendants failed to answer
the complaint and a default judgment was entered against them.75 After a two-day
hearing, the district court awarded plaintiff $4,828,300 in damages. Most of the
remaining defendants were dismissed from the suit and the case proceeded to a bench
trial against Krystopowicz.76
Plaintiff argued that the corporate defendants’ veils should be pierced to
hold Krystopowicz personally liable for the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The
district court found that the first two elements of the doctrine were satisfied but that
plaintiff had failed to prove that she had “suffered any damages as a result of
[Krystopowicz’s] domination of [the corporate entities] for an improper purpose.”77
In other words, his use of the corporations for an improper purpose did not cause her
death. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that causation existed based on “some
reasonable relationship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the actions
of the defendant.”78 To establish a “reasonable relationship,” the plaintiff must show
that some knowing or cooperative effort between the related parties resulted in unjust
injury to the plaintiff.79 “The question is not whether there is a direct link between
Krystopowicz’s conduct and [plaintiff’s] death but rather whether Krystopowicz’s
abuse of the corporate form caused some injury to plaintiff.”80 In this case, the unjust
injury to the plaintiff was not the underlying tort injury; rather, the plaintiff was
injured by the inability of corporate defendants to pay the judgment,81 and that injury
was caused by Krystopowicz’s actions.
Beyond Garcia v. Coffman and Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, there is very
little discussion of the causation requirement by New Mexico courts. Outside New
Mexico, many states apply tests incorporating the first two elements of the New

73. Id. ¶ 3.
74. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
75. Id. ¶ 9.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
78. Id. ¶¶ 13, 26 (quoting Krendl & Krendl, supra note 41, at 27) (emphasis added). See also Harlow
v. Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 11, 100 N.M. 379, 382, 671 P.3d 40, 43; Alto Eldorado P’ship v.
Amrep, 2005-NMCA-131, ¶ 19, 138 N.M. 607, 614, 124 P.3d 585, 592 (citing Scott v. AZL Res., Inc.,
1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 118, 121, 753 P.2d 897, 900))
79. Morrissey, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d at 23.
80. Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added).
81. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.
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Mexico test,82 but few specifically incorporate causation as a separate requirement.83
Nevertheless, the causation requirement is hardly a significant additional barrier to
recovery once the first two elements have been proved. Rather, it focuses the inquiry
on injustice and inequity in the result—entirely appropriate for an equitable remedy
and consistent with other jurisdictions84—and limits the doctrine’s application to
cases where defendant’s actions have caused some unjust harm to plaintiff. This
could be harm caused by the underlying breach of contract or tort claim, or harm
caused when the defendant corporation is unable to pay the plaintiff’s judgment. Of
course, if the controlling shareholder directly caused the harm, the plaintiff may have
a direct cause of action against the shareholder as well.
II.

OUTSIDE REVERSE PIERCING JURISPRUDENCE

In this section, I survey the jurisdictions that have considered outside
reverse piercing—cases where a third party is seeking to hold a corporation liable
for the acts of a shareholder—and discuss common themes, concerns, and key
debates in order to provide a sense of how courts approach the question of whether
to adopt or apply the doctrine.
A.

Outside Reverse Piercing in Other Jurisdictions

Not all states have considered reverse piercing,85 and even fewer have
considered both inside and outside reverse veil piercing. Still, far more states have
adopted outside reverse veil piercing than commentators commonly acknowledge.

82. See, e.g., SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454–55 (Tex. 2008);
Bagel Bros. Maple, Inc. v. Ohio Farmers, Inc., 279 B.R. 55, 62 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2002) (explaining that,
under New York law, a party seeking to pierce the veil between a corporate parent and its subsidiary must
show: (1) that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent, and (2) that the subsidiary is being
used by the parent to commit or conceal fraud or other wrongdoing (citing Kashfi v. Phibro–Salomon,
Inc., 628 F.Supp. 727, 732–33 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1986))). Colorado courts’ analyses of veil piercing also
mirror those of New Mexico courts with respect to the first two elements (alter ego and improper purpose)
but diverge as to the third element. Whereas New Mexico courts require a finding of causation as the third
element, Colorado courts ask the plaintiff to demonstrate that piercing the veil is required to achieve an
equitable result. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) (“Achieving an equitable result is the
paramount goal of traditional piercing of the corporate veil.”). Because the causation element can be
satisfied indirectly and veil piercing is an equitable remedy in Colorado, it is not clear that this is a
meaningful difference in practice.
83. This is not to say causation is irrelevant in other jurisdictions, only that causation is not separately
broken out. Instead, something like causation will show up as part of the improper purpose discussion
and/or is established in the context of showing that legal remedies are inadequate to redress a plaintiff’s
injury.
84. See supra note 83.
85. In re Howland, 516 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014) (“Kentucky courts have not accepted
or rejected the reverse veil piercing doctrine.” (citing Turner v. Andrews, 413 S.W.3d 272, 277 n.4 (Ky.
2013))).
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To begin, three of the six states within the Tenth Circuit86—Utah,87 Wyoming,88 and
Colorado89—have adopted outside reverse veil piercing. The Utah Supreme Court
clearly adopted the doctrine in M.J. v. Wisan, although the court did not use the
language of outside reverse piercing to describe the doctrine applied:
[T]he doctrine of reverse piercing seems to us to “follow[]
logically” from the premises of the longstanding doctrine of
traditional (direct) veil-piercing. Where an individual so abuses
the corporate form that it becomes his alter ego, and where
honoring its separate existence “would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice,” it would make no sense for the law to preclude a
claimant from treating the two as if they were identical.90
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court made clear that it would recognize
outside reverse veil piercing for the same reasons offered to justify classic veil
piercing:
[W]here an individual owns all of the stock of a corporation or
substantially so, and that the [sic] corporation is in truth and in fact,
but the juristic double of its owner and where fraud or injustice
will likely operate to the injury of third persons, this situation
suffices to dissipate the separate factional identity of the
corporation and the law will have no compunction in holding the
corporation liable for the acts of its owners or vice versa.91
Finally, sitting en banc in 2008, the Colorado Supreme Court expressly
adopted outside reverse veil piercing.92 “Although the certified question of law could
be read to encompass both inside and outside reverse piercing claims, we limit our
review to outside claims due to the facts presented in this case . . . and hold that
Colorado law permits outside reverse piercing when justice so requires.” As with
Utah and Wyoming, its holding rested on “the similarities and parallel goals achieved
in outside reverse piercing and traditional piercing.”93

86. The territorial jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit includes the six states of Oklahoma, Kansas, New
Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, plus those portions of the Yellowstone National Park extending
into Montana and Idaho. See General Information, U.S. CT. APP. TENTH CIR.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk [https://perma.cc/4BJG-3784]. As far as federal courts go, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has been relatively hostile to reverse veil piercing, insisting that it will not apply
it unless applicable state law has accepted it. See, e.g., Weinman v. Hamilton Props. Corp. (In re
Hamilton), 186 B.R. 991, 999 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995).
87. M.J. v. Wisan, 2016 UT 13, ¶ 78, 371 P.3d 21, 36 (“[The] doctrine of reverse piercing ‘follow[(s)]
logically’ from the premises of the longstanding doctrine of traditional (direct) veil-piercing.” (quoting
Transamerica Cash Reserve, In. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990))).
88. State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 144 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1944).
89. In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 645 (Colo. 2006).
90. Wisan, 2016 UT 13, ¶ 78, 371 P.3d at 36 (internal citations omitted).
91. Christensen, 144 P.2d at 950.
92. Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645 (“Colorado law permits outside reverse piercing when justice so
requires.”).
93. Id.
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Of the remaining three Tenth Circuit jurisdictions,94 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court recently observed in dicta that the state has not adopted the reverse-piercing
doctrine,95 but the question was not before the court in that case.96 Similarly, the
Kansas Supreme Court has not decided whether to adopt or reject reverse veil
piercing. New Mexico has applied the doctrine without naming it in at least one
case.97 It is not clear what Oklahoma and Kansas98 will do when presented with the
question, but this Article suggests that New Mexico is likely to follow Utah,
Wyoming, and Colorado and explicitly adopt the doctrine.
Outside the Tenth Circuit, Idaho,99 Indiana,100 Iowa,101 Montana,102
Nebraska,103 Nevada,104 New York,105 North Carolina,106 Pennsylvania,107

94. I leave Montana and Idaho out of the Tenth Circuit discussion, since the only parts of these states
in the Tenth Circuit are the portions of Yellowstone National Park that extend into them. I note, however,
that both Montana and Idaho have adopted outside veil piercing. See infra, notes 100 and 103,
respectively.
95. Lind v. Barnes Tag Agency, Inc., 2018 OK 35, ¶ 22, 418 P.3d 698, 705.
96. In re Denton, No. 99-6059, 2000 WL 107376 (10th Cir. Jan. 1, 2000) (unpublished table
decision).
97. Supra, note 22.
98. In the context of an inside reverse piercing claim, the Tenth Circuit expressed doubt that Kansas
would adopt reverse piercing. Denton, 2000 WL 107376, at *4.
99. Minich v. Gem State Devs., Inc., 591 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Idaho 1979). But see Jordan v. Hunter,
865 P.2d 990, 996 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (containing the Idaho Court of Appeals’ rejection of “insider”
reverse piercing.).
100. Lambert v. Farmers Bank, Frankfort, Ind. 519 N.E.2d 745, 748–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (“There
was no error in the trial court’s decision to disregard the corporate entity of Lambert Enterprises and
subject its assets to execution in satisfaction of William Lambert’s personal debts, including the judgment
in favor of the Farmers Bank.”); see also Colin E. Flora, When, How & Why of Piercing the Corporate
Veil in Indiana, RES GESTAE, Nov. 2016, at 13, 16.
101. The court did not use the phrase “reverse piercing,” but was willing to disregard “the corporate
entity to allow plaintiff judgment creditor to directly reach the corporate assets” of defendant’s
corporation. Central Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Wagener, 183 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1971); see also
Matthew G. Dore, Lifting the Veil on Iowa Piercing Jurisprudence, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 664 (2019).
102. Martinson v. Towe (In re Towe), 173 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D Mon. 1994).
103. Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113 (Neb. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff could pierce the
veil of her former husband’s corporation to reach property held in the name of the corporation). See also
Christopher W. Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Nebraska, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 247, 265
(2018).
104. LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000) (finding that the alter ego doctrine may
apply in reverse to reach corporation’s assets and satisfy the controlling individual’s debt).
105. State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908–09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah
Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 50 F.
Supp. 3d 267, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
106. Strategic Outsourcing, Inc. v. Stacks, 625 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (approving outside
reverse veil piercing); Fischer Inv. Cap. Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(applying Stacks).
107. Mass v. Bell Atl. Tricon Leasing Corp. (In re Mass), 178 B.R. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1995); 718 Arch
Street Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 192 F.3d 88 (3rd Cir. 1990) (recognizing outside reverse
veil piercing under Pennsylvania law but refusing to apply it under the facts of the case).
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Tennessee,108 Texas,109 Virginia,110 Washington,111 Wisconsin,112 and the District of
Columbia113 have considered and adopted outside reverse veil piercing. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut made clear it would adopt the doctrine,114 but the legislature
overruled it.115 In Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
inside reverse piercing in furtherance of the public policy aims of the state.116 The
court’s reasoning in this case suggests that it would be open to an outside reverse
piercing claim where it too was consistent with Minnesota public policy.117 Finally,
federal courts have applied the outside reverse piercing doctrine as a matter of federal
law to “reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy the tax debt of an individual”118
and in circumstances of alleged Medicare and Medicaid fraud.119

108. Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame, 947 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Under Tennessee law,
there is no basis for a reverse alter ego or reverse veil piercing claim outside the parent-subsidiary
context.”).
109. Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990); Yamin v. Carroll Wayne
Conn, L.P., 574 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).
110. C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd., 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003) (holding that Virginia recognizes
the concept of outsider reverse piercing); Dry Handy Invs., Ltd. v. Corvina Shipping Co., 988 F.Supp.2d
579 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying First Flight Ltd.).
111. W. G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wash. 1956) (citing Platt v. Bradner Co., 230
P. 633, 635 (1924) (“[W]hen one corporation so dominates and controls another as to make that other a
simple instrumentality or adjunct to it, the courts will look beyond the legal fiction of distinct corporate
existence, as the interests of justice require; and where stock ownership is resorted to not for the purpose
of participating in the affairs of the corporation in the customary and usual manner, but for the purpose of
controlling the subsidiary company so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the
owning company, the court will not permit itself to be blinded by mere corporate form, but will, in a
proper case, disregard corporate entity, and treat the two corporations as one.”)).
112. Olen v. Phelps, 546 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating alter ego doctrine can be
applied in reverse to reach assets of controlled entity).
113. Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
114. McKay v. Longman, 211 A.3d 20 (Conn. 2019).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-673a–33-673c (2019).
116. 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985).
117. See also Roepke v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. 1981) (holding
that the corporate veil could be pierced to hold that driver was the “insured” under corporate policies,
where deceased driver of van was the president and sole shareholder of the named insured corporation,
the vehicles insured were used as family vehicles, neither the driver nor his household owned any other
vehicles, and no shareholder or creditor would be adversely affected).
118. United States v. Stephens, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1151–52 (D. Mont. 2009); Tarpey v. United
States, CV-17-94-BMM, 2019 WL 5820727 (D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2019); see also Lunnon v. United States,
2020 WL 8413557 (D.N.M. Dec. 18, 2020) (citing United States v. Scherping, 187 F.3d 796, 803 (8th
Cir. 1999)) (explaining that reverse piercing is a well-established theory in the federal tax realm). Federal
courts have also adopted and applied inside reverse piercing doctrine in the context of remedial social
legislation such as the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Chao v. OSHRC, 401 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.
2005).
119. Smith v. Carolina Med. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 3d 300 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
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A handful of states have rejected reverse piercing in one form or another.120
However, in others states—such as Delaware,121 Illinois,122 and Florida123—it is less
clear whether some form of reverse piercing has been (or will be) adopted or rejected,
either because there are conflicting decisions or because cases are ambiguously
written.124 In Florida, for example, at least one court has held that veil piercing may
occur in either direction,125 but other courts in the state have been less clear.
Louisiana and Maine have rejected inside reverse piercing but have not decided on
outside reverse piercing.126 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected inside veil
piercing,127 but the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, stated that outside veil
piercing likely would be acceptable under Illinois law: “The question is whether,
because the corporations were [the defendant’s] alter egos, they could be made liable
for his debts, and we assume the answer is yes.”128
No Delaware court has adopted outside reverse piercing.129 Accordingly,
most federal courts asked to apply Delaware law have declined to reverse veil pierce
in the absence of a state court decision adopting the doctrine.130 But in 2018, the
120. Ohio, Georgia, and California have mostly made it clear that they reject the doctrine, but I say
“mostly” because, in the case of Georgia and California, there are some decisions that call that rejection
into question. See Curci Invs., LLC v. Baldwin, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 847, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); see also
Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873, 874 (Ga. 2003).
121. Sky Cable, LLC v. Coley, No. 5:11cv00048, 2016 WL 3926492, at *58 (W.D. Va. July 18, 2016)
(“[G]iven the particular facts of this case . . . Delaware law would recognize the reverse veil-piercing
theory and apply it here, finding that [the shareholder] is the alter ego of his limited liability companies.”);
Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375, 388 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Delaware would recognize
outsider reverse piercing of an LLC’s veil when the LLC is the alter ego of its sole member.”). But see,
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 213 F.Supp.3d 683, 691 n.7 (D. Del. 2016),
reversed on other ground by Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 879 F.3d 79 (3rd Cir.
2018) (stating that whether Delaware law recognizes reverse veil piercing is an unsettled question).
122. See e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The question is whether,
because the corporations were Douglas’s alter egos, they could be made liable for his debts, and we
assume the answer is yes.”). This would ordinarily limit its application to “one-man corporations” because
“if there is more than one shareholder the seizing of the corporation’s assets to pay a shareholder’s debts
would be a wrong to the other shareholders.” Id. at 758. But see Gierum v. Glick (In re Glick), 568 B.R.
634 (2017) (providing that Illinois law does not recognize outsider reverse piercing theory.).
123. Estudios, Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. (EPICA) v. Swiss Bank Corp.
(Overseas) S.A., 507 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
124. In Maine, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt reverse piercing in
circumstances of attempted inside reverse piercing for reasons that were clearly specific to inside reverse
piercing; thus, it is not clear that the reasoning would apply in the context of outside reverse piercing.
Sturtevant v. Town of Winthrop, 1998 ME 84, ¶ 21, 732 A.2d 264, 270 (Me. 1999); see also Mar-Kay
Plastics, Inc. v. Reid Plastics, Inc. (In re Mar-Kay Plastics, Inc.), 234 B.R. 473, 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1999) (“The general rule is that alter ego claims belong to third parties and that corporate veil should
never be pierced for the benefit of corporation or its stockholders.”).
125. Swiss Bank, 507 So.2d 1119.
126. Sturtevant, 732 A.2d at 270; Smith v. Cotton’s Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. 1987).
127. In re Rehabilitation of Centaur Ins. Co., 632 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ill. 1994); Forsythe v. Clark
USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 241–42 (Ill. 2007) (approving In re Rehabilitation of Centaur Ins. Co.).
128. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Gierum v. Glick (In re Glick),
568 B.R. 634, 663 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
129. But see Sky Cable, LLC v. Coley, No. 5:11cv00048, 2016 WL 3926492 (W.D. Va. July 18,
2016); Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2018).
130. See PNC Bank v. Udell, No. 16 C 5400, 2017 WL 3478814 (N.D. Ill.).
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Fourth Circuit concluded that Delaware would recognize outside reverse piercing of
an LLC’s veil where an LLC was a sham and the alter ego of its sole member that
was being used to defraud creditors.131 The Fourth Circuit did so, at least in part,
because Delaware courts had signaled an openness to the doctrine.132
B.

Common Themes

While many outside reverse piercing cases have been decided in the United
States, a careful review reveals common themes across most jurisdictions: (1) courts
regularly observe that outside reverse piercing and traditional veil piercing share
crucial similarities and parallel policy goals; (2) courts often find the decision to
reverse pierce is heavily fact dependent; (3) courts generally grant tort and other
involuntary creditors greater leniency in piercing the corporate veil than they do to
contract and other voluntary creditors; and (4) courts express concern about the
effects of reverse piercing on nonculpable shareholders and creditors. In this section,
I briefly examine each of these themes in turn.

1.

Similarities between outside reverse and traditional veil piercing
warrant the adoption of the former where the latter is recognized

Outside reverse piercing and traditional veil piercing share crucial
similarities and parallel policy goals,133 which is not the case with inside reverse
piercing.134 Outside reverse veil piercing claims—like traditional veil piercing
claims—are brought by third-party creditors who have been harmed by a
shareholder’s use of the corporate form for an improper purpose. Writing for the
Colorado Supreme Court in In Re Phillips,135 Justice Martinez stated:
Both types of piercing strive to achieve an equitable result. In
traditional piercing, equity requires the veil be pierced to impose
liability on a shareholder who has abused the corporate form for
his or her own advantage. Similarly, in outside reverse piercing,

131. Coley, 2016 WL 3926492; DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375. For a discussion of this case and its
implications for Delaware law, see David G. Epstein & Jake Weiss, The Fourth Circuit, “Suem” and
Reverse Veil Piercing in Delaware, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1189 (2019).
132. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d at 387–88 (citations omitted):
In Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC, the Court of Chancery of Delaware noted that
“where [a] subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent to the extent that the Court may engage in ‘reverse
veil-piercing,’ the Court may treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent” for certain purposes.
And, in another decision, the Delaware Chancery Court observed that a claim of traditional veil piercing
“might have prevailed” had it been presented properly as a claim of reverse veil piercing.
133. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “outsider reverse piercing ‘follows logically
the premises of traditional veil piercing.’” Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375, 386 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citing HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 8:18 (Rev. 3d ed. 2020)).
134. By definition, inside reverse piercing claims are brought by a corporate insider or shareholder,
who presumably benefited as a shareholder of the corporation whose veil it seeks to pierce. See, e.g.,
supra note 11.
135. In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 645 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
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an equitable result is achieved by ignoring the corporate fiction to
attach liability to the corporation. “Indeed, it is particularly
appropriate to apply the alter ego doctrine in ‘reverse’ when the
controlling party uses the controlled entity to hide assets or
secretly to conduct business to avoid the preexisting liability of the
controlling party.” Thus, the purpose of obtaining a just result is
furthered by permitting outside reverse piercing in Colorado.136
The Virginia Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in C.F. Trust,
Inc. v. First Flight L.P.:137
We conclude that there is no logical basis upon which to
distinguish between a traditional veil piercing action and an
outsider reverse piercing action. In both instances, a claimant
requests that a court disregard the normal protections accorded a
corporate structure to prevent abuses of that structure.138
This is consistent with the approaches of Texas and Washington courts.139
Ultimately, the argument for adopting outside reverse piercing in New Mexico is the
same as the argument for continuing to apply traditional veil piercing. Indeed,
judgments refusing to adopt outside reverse veil piercing are often grounded in a
clear commitment to shrink the opportunities for any kind of veil piercing.
2.

Reverse veil piercing is heavily fact dependent

Veil piercing is an equitable and heavily fact dependent remedy.140 As with
traditional veil piercing, the decision to reverse pierce and disregard a corporate
structure to impose liability is a fact-specific determination, and the factual
circumstances surrounding the corporation and the questioned act will be closely
scrutinized in each case.141 Courts emphasize that “[t]here is no litmus test for
determining when the corporate fiction should be disregarded; the result depends on
the circumstances of each case.”142 Veil piercing is a purpose-driven, results-based
doctrine with a clear substantive goal: prevent the abuse of the corporate form. Veil
piercing is necessary for the proper functioning of both corporate law and the
economy in general. The complexity of corporate formalities and corporate

136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003).
138. Id. at 810.
139. Yamin v. Carroll Wayne Conn, L.P., 574 S.W.3d 50, 66–67 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018) (“We have
recognized that reverse veil-piercing is appropriate in circumstances analogous to those that justify
traditional veil-piercing.”); see also W. G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956).
140. See, e.g., Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Amrep, 2005-NMCA-131, 138 N.M. 607, 616, 124 P.3d 585,
594 (2005) (demonstrating that corporate formation for an improper purpose is highly fact specific); In re
Raymond, 529 B.R. 455, 475 (Bkrtcy.D.Mass. 2015) (“In Massachusetts, piercing the corporate veil is a
well-recognized, yet fact specific, remedy.”); see also Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60, 74 (1st Cir.
2010); My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Mass. 1968).
141. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 66; C.F. Trust, 580 S.E.2d at 810.
142. LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 847 (Nev. 2000) (quoting Polaris Indus. Corp. v.
Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884, 887 (Nev. 1987)); see also Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 66.
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compliance create the potential for misbehavior. Furthermore, this complexity
provides a variety of circumstances under which misbehavior can occur.
The doctrine’s fact dependency may enable trial lawyers to distinguish past
decisions where courts refused to apply the doctrine based on the facts of their cases.
This fact dependency may also explain why some jurisdictions have contradictory
decisions that purport to both adopt and reject the reverse piercing doctrine. Finally,
the doctrine’s fact dependency should provide the New Mexico Supreme Court with
some comfort that, if adopted, outside reverse veil piercing would not open the
floodgates because courts would still be required to carefully consider and articulate
fact-specific reasons for piercing the veil in either direction.
3.

Greater leniency is given in tort cases

It appears that courts across the United States generally grant tort victims,
and other involuntary creditors, greater leniency in piercing the corporate veil than
they do contract claimants, especially financial institutions. In an empirical study of
2,908 cases from 1958 to 2006, Professor Peter Oh confirmed that outside reverse
piercing claims not only prevail more often in tort than contract, but they also adhere
to the voluntary/involuntary creditor distinction.143 This makes sense when
incentives are considered. Professor Christopher Peterson succinctly summarized
such considerations in his study of Nebraska law:
The policy justifications for the trend are fairly straight forward
[sic]: companies have an incentive to engage in excessive risk
taking and to shift the costs of such risks to unwary third parties.
Involuntary creditors are therefore, in effect, subsidizing
corporations for their excessive risk taking. And as compared to
voluntary contract creditors, a court of equity should be less
willing to grant relief to a creditor that has the prospective ability
to protect itself through verifying information and obtaining
security interests and guarantees.144
The observation that courts appear to be less willing to pierce the corporate
veil for voluntary creditors is also consistent with a public policy commitment to
freedom of contract.145 Under contract law, voluntary arrangements, once formed,
should be respected except in rare cases; parties should be assumed to have allocated
risks for contingencies among themselves. The established defenses to contract
formation—duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, and unconscionability—
serve as gatekeepers to ensure voluntariness.
Conversely, a greater willingness to pierce the corporate veil for involuntary
creditors is consistent with the public policy underlying tort law. In New Mexico,

143. Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 90 (2010).
144. Christopher W. Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Nebraska, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 247,
276 (2018); see also Christopher W. Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil by Tort Creditors, 13 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 63, 79 (2017). Interestingly, the concerns described by Peterson echo those raised in inside
reverse piercing cases. This makes sense as insiders are voluntary in many of the same ways one might
describe voluntary creditors and presumably may prospectively protect themselves.
145. New Mexico’s public policy strongly favors freedom of contract. United Wholesale Liquor Co.
v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 1989-NMSC-030, ¶ 8, 108 N.M. 467, 775 P.2d 233 (1987).
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courts have adopted a fault-based system of tort law that holds tortfeasors responsible
for the loss they cause.146 Specifically, tort law in New Mexico is based on four
principles: (1) redistributing the economic burden147 of loss from the victim; (2)
deterring conduct that society regards as unreasonable or immoral;148 (3) creating a
means for the victim to obtain compensation for wrongs committed against them;
and (4) providing a venue to condemn and prevent certain behaviors in society.149
The objectives of tort law are based on the societal benefit of holding “wrongdoers
responsible for the harmful consequences of their own behavior.”150 These objectives
are consistent with the veil piercing doctrine, which seeks to hold the wrongdoer-infact responsible for the harmful consequences of its behavior.
According to Professor Peterson, courts do not apply a different test for
cases involving tort victims; rather, courts apply the same test more leniently.
Courts’ leniency with respect to tort creditors is exhibited in the
weight such courts afford the tort creditors’ policy justifications.
Courts are generally not applying different veil-piercing tests to
tort creditors, but administer the same tests more leniently. This
occurs as veil-piercing factors are re-weighted in favor of the tort
creditor. The court also takes into account persuasive policy
justifications for such creditors because these courts generally do
not limit themselves to consideration of only a closed set of
factors.151
Veil piercing is a flexible and equitable doctrine. Its flexibility gives courts
space to use it differently in cases involving voluntary and involuntary creditors. But
it may be a mistake to understand this as leniency per se, at least in any formal sense.
Differing outcomes are more likely a function of the doctrine’s fact-dependent
inquiry and equitable goals.
4.

Concerns about the effect on nonculpable shareholders and creditors

Courts have rejected outside reverse piercing for a few key reasons, none
of which ultimately hold up under scrutiny. Some courts view any extension of veil
piercing as an unacceptable threat to limited liability. But outside reverse piercing
presents no greater risk to limited liability than traditional veil piercing.
146. Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-027, ¶ 11, 125 N.M. 643, 964 P.2d 807 (1998).
147. The goal of providing a victim with adequate compensation exists for both economic and physical
injury. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 21–22, 134 N.M. 341, 76 P.3d 1098
(2003).
148. New Mexico seems to be moving away from a focus on morality and, instead, embracing the idea
of risk allocation, at least in the context of negligence. “In this regard it should be remembered that the
policy behind the law of torts does more than compensate victims—it encourages reasonable safeguards
against the risk of harm.” Saiz v. Belen School Dist., 1992-NMSC-018, ¶ 26, 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102
(1992).
149. Trujillo v. Albuquerque, 1990-NMSC-083, ¶ 10, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990), rev’d on
other grounds, 965 P.2d 305.
150. United Rentals NW., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 20, 148 N.M. 426, 237
P.3d 728 (2010).
151. Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Nebraska, supra note 145, at 276; see also Peterson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil by Tort Creditors, supra note 145, at 78–79.
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Other courts refusing to adopt outside reverse piercing have expressed
concern that no matter its similarity to traditional veil piercing, it presents at least
two problems that a standard pierce does not.152 First, the Tenth Circuit has expressed
concern that a reverse pierce “bypasses normal judgment-collection procedures.”153
This is true, but only in circumstances where normal judgment-collection procedures
are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff and the court has made a finding that the
corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder.154 If that is the case, then judgmentcollection procedures should give the plaintiff access to both the shareholder’s and
the corporation’s property as one and the same.
Second, the Tenth Circuit has been troubled by the potential for prejudice
to nonculpable shareholders and creditors if the corporation’s assets are attached
directly.155 This concern is rational. In an outside reverse pierce, a corporation is
liable for the acts of a shareholder. If that corporation is a multi-shareholder
corporation, then any order requiring a corporation to pay for the actions of a single
shareholder will likely come at the expense of nonculpable shareholders to the extent
that the value of their shares diminish. Similarly, if assets of a corporation are used
to satisfy the debts of a shareholder, then creditors of the corporation are similarly
prejudiced. But these risks are ones that courts are well equipped to handle. For one
thing, this concern should not foreclose the possibility of outside reverse veil piercing
where the corporation is held by a single shareholder and/or there is sufficient
remaining value in the corporation to satisfy the claims of corporate creditors.
Furthermore, veil piercing is an equitable remedy that empowers the court to
consider the totality of the circumstances—including the number and interests of
shareholders and creditors, for example—and balance competing harms before
deciding to pierce the veil.
One of the simplest and best challenges to courts that reject reverse piercing
on this basis was made by Judge Faris in In re Rolloffs Hawaii, LLC:
Speaking metaphorically, the prohibition on reverse piercing
means that a court can punch holes in the veil separating the
corporation from its shareholders, but must install a one-way valve
that allows liabilities to flow only from the corporation to one or
more shareholders, but not in the opposite direction. Few cases
explain why the one-way valve should always be required, or (in
other words) why a court could not ever let liabilities flow in the
opposite direction or simply tear down the veil altogether. The
only explanation I have seen states that reverse piercing could
force nonculpable shareholders of a corporation to bear the cost of
the culpable shareholder’s wrongdoing. But this does not explain
why reverse piercing should be prohibited even where there is only

152. Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576–78 (10th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 1577 (cited with approval by Justice Eid writing for the dissent, In re Phillips, 139 P.3d
639, 649 (Colo. 2006)).
154. For arguments against expanding veil piercing doctrine to include outside reverse piercing, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, LIMITED LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
187–90 (2016).
155. Cascade Energy, 896 F.2d at 1576–78; see also Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1299 (10th Cir.
1998).
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one shareholder, or all shareholders are culpable, or the court could
fashion a remedy that would protect the nonculpable
shareholders.156
It would be a mistake to assume that courts adopting reverse piercing are
not cognizant of the potential harm to nonculpable investors and creditors. In fact,
courts adopting the doctrine acknowledge these concerns and have either limited the
doctrine’s application to protect nonculpable investors and creditors157 or specifically
counseled trial courts to consider the potential implications for nonculpable investors
and creditors as a factor when deciding whether to grant the equitable remedy.158
IV.

PROPOSED APPROACH FOR NEW MEXICO

It seems likely that New Mexico will adopt outside reverse veil piercing if
presented with circumstances justifying its application. New Mexico has in fact
already used the doctrine without naming it. In Addison v. Tessier,159 the defendant
shareholder had transferred assets to a corporation, in which he had a 98 percent
interest, to avoid paying creditors. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that “the
legal entity of the corporation must be disregarded for purposes of satisfying
appellant’s judgment [against the shareholder].”160 Without using the vocabulary of
outside reverse veil piercing, the court permitted the creditor to pierce the corporate
veil and reach the assets of the corporation to satisfy the debts of its controlling
shareholder.161 It did so even though the creditor had not attempted to attach the stock
to satisfy its judgment.162 Of particular relevance to the court was the fact that the
defendant had used the corporation to hinder and defraud his creditors.
If New Mexico were to explicitly adopt the doctrine of outside reverse veil
piercing, a review of relevant case law suggests the following approach. First, as
with traditional piercing, courts should consider the decision to ignore the separate
existence of a corporate entity and impose personal liability upon shareholders for
debts of the corporation an extraordinary act to be taken only when necessary to
156. In re Rolloffs Hawaii, LLC, No. 16-01294, 2019 WL 2621767, at *10 n.34 (Bankr. D. Haw. June
25, 2019) (emphasis added).
157. In In re Moore, for example, the court held that, “reverse veil piercing should only be applied
when it is clear that it will not prejudice non-culpable shareholders or other stakeholders (such as creditors)
of a corporation.” 379 B.R. 284, 295 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Tex. 2007).
158. In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 645–46 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (“We recognize that some
jurisdictions refuse to allow outside reverse piercing of the corporate form because, when inartfully
performed, outside reverse piercing has the potential to prejudice innocent shareholders and creditors, and
to bypass normal judgment procedures. See, e.g., Cascade Energy, 896 F.2d at 1577 . . . [T]his concern is
effectively alleviated by the requirement that piercing obtain an equitable result. . . . When innocent
shareholders or creditors would be prejudiced by outside reverse piercing, an equitable result is not
achieved. Innocent shareholders possess legitimate expectations that corporate assets will be insulated
from the claims of a controlling insider’s creditors. Similarly, secured and unsecured creditors of the
corporation have a cognizable legal interest in corporate assets, upon which they relied in lending money
and selling goods and services to the corporation. Accordingly, equity requires that innocent shareholders
and creditors be adequately protected before outside reverse piercing is appropriate under Colorado law.”).
159. 1959-NMSC-010, ¶ 1, 65 N.M. 222, 335 P.2d 554.
160. Id.
161. Id. at ¶ 16, 335 P.2d at 228.
162. Id. at ¶ 15, 335 P.2d at 227.
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avoid injustice.163 Second, when determining whether outside reverse
piercing is appropriate, courts should consider the same factors that are
considered when determining whether traditional veil piercing should be
permitted.164 In New Mexico, the corporate form may be disregarded where
three elements are met:
(a)
The corporate form is determined to be a mere instrument
(alter ego) of an individual.165 The plaintiff creditor must establish
a unity of interest and ownership166 such that the shareholder’s
control renders the corporation a mere instrumentality of the
shareholder.167 The corporate shareholder could be an individual
or another corporation. Trial courts should consider the factors set
out in Cruttenden when deciding whether a corporation is the alter
ego or instrumentality of a shareholder,168 understanding that the
list is neither exhaustive nor determinative.
(b)
The corporate form has been used for an improper
purpose or adherence to its separate existence would create an
injustice.169 Even though no single rule or criterion is dispositive,
the litigant who seeks to disregard a limited liability entity must
show, for example, that the entity has been controlled or used by
the debtor/defendant to evade a personal obligation, to perpetrate
a fraud or a crime, to create injustice or inequity,170 or to gain an
unfair advantage.171

163. Scott v. AZL Resources, 1988–NMSC–028, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897, 900 (“Only under
special circumstances will the courts disregard the corporate entity to pierce the corporate veil holding
individual shareholders or a parent corporation liable. This is done where the corporation was set up for
fraudulent purposes or where to recognize the corporation would result in injustice.”); C.F. Trust Inc. v.
First Flight L.P., 580 S.E.2d 806, 809–10 (2003); In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 646.
164. C.F. Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 810; In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 646. See also Zahra Spiritual Trust
v. U.S., 910 F.2d 240, 243–44 (5th Cir. 1990); JSC Foreign Econ. Ass’n Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev.
& Trade Servs., Inc., 386 F.Supp.2d 461, 461–465 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Liberty Synergistics, Inc. v. Microflo
Ltd., 50 F.Supp.3d 267, 297–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
165. Scott v. AZL Res., Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897; Cruttenden v.
Mantura, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 197 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932, 935.
166. C.F. Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 811.
167. Cruttenden, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 640 P.2d at 934 (citing Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury,
524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975)); Scott, 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 753 P.2d at 900.
168. Cruttenden, 1982-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 753 P.2d at 934–35 (citing Int’l Union v. Cardwell Mfg. Co.,
416 F. Supp. 1267, 1286 (D. Kan. 1976)). These are substantially the same factors famously outlined by
Frederick Powell. See FREDERICK POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY 9 (1931).
169. Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 1976-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 17–18, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d (Courts
may look behind the corporate form “where the corporation was set up for fraudulent purposes, or where
to recognize the corporation would result in inequity.”); Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 1983-NMCA-117, ¶ 15,
100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40, 43; Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 20; C.F.
Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 811.
170. Garcia, 1997-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 20–22, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216, 220–21.
171. C.F. Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 811; In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 645 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); In re
Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d. Cir. 1999); In re Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 326
(Wyo. 2002).
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(c)
The misuse of the corporate form caused harm to the
plaintiff.172 This does not necessarily mean that it directly caused
the underlying harm—breach of contract damages or tort-related
harm, for example—but causation is to be construed broadly in
accordance with Morrissey v. Krystopowicz.173 The plaintiff must
show that it was harmed by defendant’s actions. This could be
harm caused by the underlying breach of contract or tort, or harm
caused when a shareholder is unable to pay the plaintiff’s
judgment by virtue of its misbehavior.
If these elements are met, courts must still balance the equities to determine whether
to grant the relief sought, including the impact of such action upon innocent investors
(ie, non-implicated shareholders) and innocent creditors, as well as the availability
of other remedies to the plaintiff.174 Finally, a litigant who seeks the remedy of
outside reverse veil piercing will have to prove the necessary standards by
clear and convincing evidence.175
VI.

CONCLUSION

The case for adopting outside reverse veil piercing in New Mexico is the
same case for continuing to apply traditional veil piercing in the state. The potential
tensions between New Mexico’s commitment to limited liability176 and freedom of
contract,177 on the one hand, and equity178 on the other, are virtually the same whether
applying traditional or outside reverse piercing. Either equity will overcome public
policy arguments in favor of limited liability and freedom of contract, or it will not,
but the direction of the pierce should not be determinative. While it is true that
outside reverse piercing potentially implicates nonculpable shareholders and
creditors, courts are well-equipped to account for such concerns in their application
of the doctrine. And if anything, the state’s commitment to equity should favor the
expansion of the veil piercing doctrine to explicitly include outside reverse piercing.
Again, borrowing from the decision of Justice Martinez writing for the majority of

172. Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶¶ 10-13, 671 P.2d 40, 43. See also Fischer Inv. Capital, Inc. v.
Catawba Development Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143, 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
173. 2016-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 13, 17, 365 P.3d at 23.
174. C.F. Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 811; In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645.
175. C.F. Trust Inc., 580 S.E.2d at 811; In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644. This is consistent with the
language used in Harlow, 1983-NMCA-117, ¶¶ 31, 671 P.2d at 46 (noting the “intent to deceive not
established by clear and convincing evidence”).
176. In New Mexico, “limited liability is the rule, not the exception.” S. Union Expl. Co. v. Wynn
Expl. Co., 1981-NMCA-006, ¶ 26, 95 N.M. 594, 624 P.2d 536.
177. In New Mexico, there is a strong public policy in favor of freedom of contract. United Wholesale
Liquor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 1989-NMSC-030, ¶ 14, 108 N.M. 467, 775 P.2d 233.
178. Equity is used by New Mexico courts where justice necessitates it, including in the context of
corporate law. Torres v. Montano, No. 30,207, 2012 WL 868941, at *6 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2012)
(unpublished opinion). Equity will intervene and overcome the public policy presumptions in favor of
limited liability and freedom of contract where there is obvious “fraud, real hardship, oppression, mistake,
or unconscionable results,” and the other grounds of righteousness, justice, and morality. Id. *6. Veil
piercing is just such an equitable doctrine.
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the Colorado Supreme Court, “[T]he purpose of obtaining a just result is furthered
by permitting outside reverse piercing.”179
One commentator has suggested that New Mexico “appears to be a
conservative veil-piercing jurisdiction.”180 A close reading of the cases suggests
otherwise. New Mexico courts are rightfully concerned with respecting the separate
entity status of corporations, but they also evince a willingness to use their equitable
powers to pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where a corporation is “operated
not in a legitimate fashion to serve the valid goals and purposes of that corporation
but . . . instead under the domination and control and for the purposes of some
dominant party.”181 Both public policy and logic suggest New Mexico courts will be
equally open to outside reverse veil piercing in similar circumstances, “where to
recognize the [separate entity status of the] corporation would result in inequity.”182

179. In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 645 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
180. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2:32 (2020).
181. Morrissey v. Krystopowicz, 2016-NMCA-011, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 20, 23 (citing Scott v. AZL Res.,
Inc., 1988-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d).
182. Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 1976-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 17–18, 89 N.M. 208, 549 P.2d 623.

